

11 USC § 105(a)
11 USC § 365(b)(1)(A)
11 USC § 524(e)
11 USC § 1103(c)
11 USC § 1112(b)
11 USC § 1123
11 USC § 1141(c)
Assumption
Cure
Disclosure
Exculpation Clause
Feasibility
Good Faith
Indemnification
Injunction
Releases
Settlement

WCI Cable, Inc., et al., Case No. 301-38242-rld11

06/27/02

RLD

Published

Following a four day hearing, the court confirmed the debtors' Chapter 11 plan of reorganization ("Plan") in these jointly administered cases, which provided for a sale of debtors' assets to Neptune Communications, LLC ("Neptune"), subject to certain conditions, and over the objections of various parties in interest.

The Plan contained a number of release, exculpation, injunction and indemnification provisions, which were the subject of objection on the basis that § 524(e) precludes discharge of a debtors' liability from affecting the liability of any other entity for the debt.

First, the Plan incorporated releases and an injunction in favor of debtors' 90% shareholder, AMP Life Ltd. ("AMP"). Specifically, the Plan released claims which the debtors held against AMP, and the injunction precluded interested parties from pursuing the released claims. The releases and injunction were

part of debtors' settlement with AMP which was submitted for approval as a part of the Plan pursuant to § 1123. The court found that the proposed settlement (1) was noticed to all creditors and (2) satisfied the standards set forth in In re A & C Properties, 784 F.2d 1377, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1986), and the court approved the AMP settlement as consistent with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.

Second, the Plan released debtors' claims against Alcatel, the creditor that constructed parts of debtors' undersea fiber optic telecommunications cable system, and further provided for the release of claims between Alcatel and AMP with respect to AMP's alleged guaranty of debtors' obligation to Alcatel, all pursuant to a settlement between and among debtors, AMP and Alcatel. Under the settlement Alcatel was to receive an 82.5% distribution on its allowed unsecured claim in the amount of \$26.183 million. The Alcatel settlement formed the basis for the proposed 82.5% dividend to all other general unsecured creditors, as noticed in the Plan, which subsequently was increased to approximately 100% during the course of the confirmation hearing. The court approved the Alcatel settlement, including the release provisions.

Third, the Plan settled all claims between and among the various debtors by set off; no party in interest objected, and the court approved the settlement, which provided de facto releases of all inter-company claims.

Fourth, the Plan contained an exculpation clause which was intended to limit the liability of the Creditors Committee members and their agents (excluding Notesan Pty. Ltd. ("Notesan"), debtors' minority shareholder, and entities related to Notesan) for any acts or omissions with respect to the debtors' bankruptcy proceedings, except for willful misconduct or ultra vires acts. The court clarified that the exculpation clause did not extend to Creditors Committee professionals, and found that the exculpation clause did no more than state clearly the appropriate standard for immunity available to Creditors Committee members pursuant to § 1103(c) and was therefore outside the scope of § 524(e).

Fifth, the Plan contained exculpation and injunction provisions in favor of the debtors and the trust ("Trust") to be formed under the Plan. The Plan was modified to clarify that the exculpation provision related only to post-petition acts and

omissions of officers, directors, employees, and agents, including professionals, and specifically excepted willful misconduct or gross negligence. The court noted that, in general, decisions in the Ninth Circuit appear not to favor exculpation or indemnification provisions that limit liability for negligence or breaches of fiduciary duty, and the court required that the exculpation and indemnity provision of the Plan be modified further to except negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in addition to willful misconduct and gross negligence. The injunctive provision precluded any person or entity holding a claim and/or equity interest from pursuing claims against debtors or the Trust except as provided by the Plan. The court held that it had authority under § 105(a) to approve the injunction provision to the extent necessary and appropriate to enforce the provisions of the discharge provisions of § 1141(c).

The Plan proposed the assumption of various permits/leases between debtors and the Alaska Railroad Corporation ("ARRC"), but proposed to delay cure of payment defaults under the permits/leases until the conclusion of litigation currently pending before the District Court with respect to the rate structure. The court held that § 365(b)(1)(A) required that the cure payments be made notwithstanding the pending litigation over the rate, but that the cure payments could be made subject to a reservation of any reimbursement, refund and/or setoff rights that may be found to be appropriate in any proceeding between the parties.

Notesan asserted in its objection that debtors lacked the good faith required to achieve confirmation of their Plan. Notesan contended that AMP engineered the debtors' bankruptcy filings to protect AMP's interest in the debtors at the expense of Notesan and, ultimately, to eliminate Notesan's equity interest in the debtors. The court held that this argument was more appropriate to a motion to dismiss pursuant to § 1112(b), which motion was never brought by Notesan, and that no evidence was presented at the confirmation hearing to establish that AMP inappropriately influenced the debtors to file for protection under the bankruptcy code. Further, while Notesan established that debtors failed to disclose a business relationship between Neptune, the purchaser of debtors' assets, and Alaska Communications Systems ("ACS"), a substantial competitor in the Alaska marketplace of General Communication, Inc. ("GCI"), another

bidder for debtors' assets, the non-disclosure became non-material when AMP proposed to use its Plan distribution to increase the return to the general nonpriority unsecured creditors to approximately 100% of their allowed claims.

The court found that the plan was feasible based on the fact that any regulatory risks which arose as a result of the non-disclosure of the Neptune/ACS business relationship had been assumed by Neptune, that funding appeared adequate, and that closing of the purchase of debtors' assets was likely to occur on closing.

P02-4 (67)

1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

3 In Re:) Bankruptcy Case
4) No.
5)
6 WCI CABLE, INC.,) 301-38242-rld11 **LEAD CASE**
7 WORLDNET COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,) 301-38243-rld11
8 ALASKA FIBER STAR, L.L.C.,) 301-38244-rld11
9 ALASKA NORTHSTAR COMMUNICATIONS,) 301-38245-rld11
10 L.L.C.,)
11 WCI LIGHTPOINT, L.L.C.,) 301-38246-rld11
12 WCIC HILLSBORO, L.L.C.,) 301-38247-rld11
13)
14) (Jointly Administered
15)
16 Debtors-in-Possession.) MEMORANDUM OPINION *
17)

11 After a highly contentious and relatively rapid process, the
12 Third Amended and Restated Joint Plan of Reorganization (the "WCI
13 Plan") of Debtors-in-Possession WCI Cable, Inc., WorldNet
14 Communications, Inc., Alaska Fiber Star, L.L.C., Alaska Northstar
15 Communications, L.L.C., WCI Lightpoint, L.L.C., and WCIC Hillsboro,
16 L.L.C. (collectively, the "WCI Group"), along with the competing Plan
17 of Reorganization (the "Notesan Plan") of Notesan Pty. Ltd.
18 ("Notesan"), came on for confirmation at a four day hearing (the
19 "Confirmation Hearing"), commencing on Tuesday, June 11, 2002. In
20 advance of the Confirmation Hearing, I reviewed the objections to the
21 WCI Plan and the Notesan Plan filed by various interested parties and
22 the responses to objections filed by the WCI Group and Notesan. I
23 also reviewed the proposed exhibits submitted by interested parties
24 in advance of the Confirmation Hearing. I have

25 * Pursuant to Appendix "A" to the Order Confirming Debtors' Fourth Amended and Restated Joint Plan
26 of Reorganization entered July 2, 2002, certain nonmaterial corrections were made to this
Memorandum Opinion entered June 27, 2002. This document incorporates those changes. An amended
Memorandum Opinion will not be entered.

1 reviewed carefully the authorities cited to me by the various
2 interested parties and other authorities that I consider relevant. I
3 listened closely and with interest to the testimony of witnesses
4 presented at the Confirmation Hearing. I further have considered
5 carefully and analyzed the arguments made by counsel for the various
6 interested parties during the course and at the close of the
7 Confirmation Hearing.

8 At the beginning of the last day of the Confirmation Hearing,
9 Notesan withdrew the Notesan Plan from consideration for
10 confirmation, leaving the WCI Plan as the only plan currently under
11 consideration for confirmation in these cases.

12 In light of the foregoing preparations, review and analyses, I
13 have reached a decision, and I am prepared to make my findings of
14 fact and conclusions of law on confirmation issues. However, before
15 I launch the discussion of standards and evidence relevant to my
16 ultimate decision, some background information as to the WCI Group,
17 Notesan and the history of these cases is necessary to provide con-
18 text for the analysis of confirmation issues and evidence that
19 follows.

20 The WCI Group and Its History¹

21 The WCI Group of business entities was formed to develop,
22

23 ¹ Unless otherwise indicated, the description of the business
24 and the historical background of the WCI Group, both before and after
25 the WCI Group filed their chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions, included
26 herein is taken from the WCI Group's Third Amended and Restated Joint
Disclosure Statement, approved for dissemination to creditors and
interest holders on May 3, 2002.

1 construct, own and operate a fully integrated terrestrial and
2 submarine fiber optic cable system from various points in Alaska
3 undersea across the Gulf of Alaska to the Pacific Northwest, with
4 connections to Portland and Seattle.

5 WorldNet Communications, Inc. ("WorldNet"), and WCI Cable,
6 Inc. ("WCI"), were founded in 1996 and 1997, respectively, by Rodney
7 T. Hudspeth ("Mr. Hudspeth"), an Australian entrepreneur affiliated
8 with Notesan. Initially, Mr. Hudspeth obtained financing for the
9 activities of the WCI Group from a number of sources. Ultimately,
10 however, WCI Group financing was consolidated in the hands of AMP
11 Life Ltd., a large Australian insurance company ("AMP"), in the form
12 of equity and debt.

13 The corporate ownership structure of the WCI Group is split
14 along two lines:

15 (a) WCI is owned approximately 90% by AMP and approximately
16 10% collectively by Notesan and Finowl Pty. Ltd. ("Finowl"), which
17 like Notesan is affiliated with Mr. Hudspeth. WCI has three wholly-
18 owned subsidiaries: Alaska Northstar Communications, L.L.C. ("Alaska
19 Northstar"), WCI Lightpoint, L.L.C. ("Lightpoint"), and WCIC
20 Hillsboro, L.L.C. ("Hillsboro").

21 (b) WorldNet likewise is owned approximately 90% by AMP and
22 approximately 10% by Notesan and Finowl collectively. Alaska Fiber
23 Star, L.L.C. ("Alaska Fiber Star"), is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
24 WorldNet.

25 Mr. Hudspeth had a grand vision for the development of the WCI
26

1 Group fiber optic cable network, and in the early years of AMP's
2 connection with the WCI Group, AMP clearly bought into that vision.
3 In fact, AMP advanced approximately \$230,000,000 to develop and
4 construct infrastructure for the WCI Group fiber optic cable network
5 and to support management for the enterprise under Mr. Hudspeth's
6 leadership as CEO. See Notesan Exs. 53; 60; 67, p. 2; 84, p. 3.

7 As the telecommunications "boom" blossomed and peaked in the
8 late 1990's, AMP apparently took comfort from the estimates of
9 enterprise values that appeared to be building up and outstripping
10 its commitments of funds to the closely held WCI Group. Although
11 bitterly contested by AMP, there is some evidence to the effect that
12 AMP made an open-ended commitment to finance the WCI Group, while
13 agreeing that the equity interest of entities affiliated with
14 Mr. Hudspeth in the WCI Group would never be diluted below 10%. See
15 Notesan Ex. 8.

16 However, as the era of "irrational exuberance" waned, a number
17 of factors combined to cause AMP to reevaluate its position regarding
18 the WCI Group:

19 1. As stated in the Examiner's Report, WCI Ex. 22, p. 51: "By
20 late 2000 and continuing through 2001 and into 2002, it became
21 apparent that a vast oversupply of bandwidth had developed as too
22 many companies had built too much capacity, a reflection of the poor
23 estimation of demand and competition." Consequently,
24 telecommunications companies like the WCI Group had built massive
25 infrastructure with massive capital commitments and no prospects for
26

1 positive cash flow. The capital markets repudiated the "new
2 economics" strategy of growth before profits and were not willing to
3 fund further substantial operating losses in the telecommunications
4 industry. Id. In this deteriorating environment, there is evidence
5 in the record that by late 2000, AMP had devalued its interest in the
6 WCI Group from \$300,000,000 to \$150,000,000, with further
7 devaluations to come. See Notesan Exs. 36 and 62.

8 2. In 2000, AMP also replaced the team of Mark Jackson and
9 Peter Cassidy, who primarily had overseen AMP's advances to the WCI
10 Group, with Douglas Hogg and Roger Greville, who apparently were more
11 hard nosed in their approach. See Notesan Ex. 53, WCI Ex. 22, p. 38.
12 Mr. Hogg, in his interview with the Examiner, stated that he found
13 the WCI Group's business plans and AMP's own paperwork concerning the
14 WCI Group to be "horrific." WCI Ex. 22, p. 38.

15 3. AMP's representatives further lost confidence in
16 Mr. Hudspeth as a manager. "They believed that Mr. Hudspeth was
17 entrepreneurial, however, he lacked the focus and the ability to
18 transform the company into an operating company. Moreover, he did
19 not assemble either qualified employees or a qualified board who
20 would be able to take the company into its next phase of operations."
21 Id. at 24.

22 As a result of AMP's concerns for its deteriorating financial
23 interest in the WCI Group and its lack of confidence in
24 Mr. Hudspeth's ability to turn the situation around, AMP exerted its
25 voting power on the Board of Directors of WCI to remove Mr. Hudspeth
26

1 as CEO at a Board meeting on March 5, 2001, and ultimately to remove
2 Mr. Hudspeth from the Board of Directors in May 2001. See Notesan
3 Exs. 11F and 11H.

4 The WCI Group fared no better under the managers selected by
5 AMP, and by the end of July, 2001, AMP refused to provide further
6 financial advances to the WCI Group. At that point, the WCI Board of
7 Directors sought out a nationally recognized workout specialist with
8 experience in the telecommunications industry and hired Mr. Keith
9 Maib ("Mr. Maib"), effective August 4, 2001. After evaluating the
10 situation of the WCI Group with incumbent management, Mr. Maib
11 recommended that the WCI Group seek protection under chapter 11 of
12 the Bankruptcy Code. The respective Boards of Directors of WCI and
13 WorldNet accepted his recommendation. All of the companies in the
14 WCI Group filed for bankruptcy protection in chapter 11 on or about
15 August 21, 2001.

16 WCI Group Proceedings in Bankruptcy

17 While these cases have been endlessly interesting, they never
18 have been easy. The WCI Group chapter 11 cases have been
19 consolidated for administrative purposes, but they have not been
20 substantively consolidated. The WCI Plan does not call for
21 substantive consolidation.

22 At an early point following the WCI Group's chapter 11
23 filings, on August 31, 2001, the court entered an Order approving the
24 retention of PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP ("PricewaterhouseCoopers")
25 as financial advisors for the WCI Group.

1 A single creditors' committee (the "Creditors Committee") was
2 appointed in the WCI case. Notesan was appointed to the Creditors
3 Committee shortly after it was formed, on September 21, 2001, and
4 served on the Creditors Committee until January 7, 2002, when Notesan
5 left the Creditors Committee in recognition of its status as a
6 potential purchaser of the WCI Group.

7 Because AMP claimed security interests in assets of the WCI
8 Group, on September 17 and October 1, 2001, the WCI Group sought and
9 obtained Orders from the court authorizing use of cash collateral
10 through December 31, 2001. Under those Orders, the WCI Group
11 preserved all rights to challenge the validity, extent and priority
12 of AMP's claimed security interests. Use of cash collateral
13 subsequently was extended through May 31, 2002, by a Stipulated Order
14 between the WCI Group and AMP.

15 (A) The WCI Group Strategy

16 Throughout the early stages of these cases, the WCI Group and
17 Mr. Maib took the position that due to severe liquidity problems and
18 an inability of the WCI Group to obtain outside financing, moving
19 rapidly, professionally and efficiently to a sale of the WCI Group's
20 assets was the optimal strategy. Consistent with that strategy,
21 Mr. Maib moved quickly to negotiate settlements of a number of
22 substantial claims and took steps to clear title problems with WCI
23 Group assets. In that regard, Mr. Maib negotiated and noticed for
24 approval by the court settlements with AT&T, TyCom and various lien
25 claimants with respect to the TyCom construction project. Mr. Maib
26

1 also negotiated an arrangement with DeJon Corporation whereby it and
2 its principal, Harold Dreyer, consented to allow the WCI Group assets
3 to be sold free and clear of their claims, while preserving the
4 substance of their claims for later determination.

5 ///

6 Mr. Maib also sought and obtained the court's approval for a
7 Bidding Procedures Order, entered on November 7, 2001, to organize
8 the process for seeking and considering bids for the purchase of WCI
9 Group assets in a sale pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.²

10 Under the Bidding Procedures Order, December 7, 2001, was set as the
11 deadline for receiving initial bids, and an auction for competition
12 among qualified bidders was scheduled to commence on December 18,
13 2001.

14 In order to allow the WCI Group to focus their attention on
15 the sale effort, Mr. Maib also sought and obtained an effective
16 moratorium on formal discovery efforts with respect to claims until a
17 data room could be set up by the WCI Group for document discovery.
18 The data room was to be ready for review by interested parties by
19 December 1, 2001.

20 (B) The Position of Notesan and the Creditors Committee

21 At least through December 2001, the Creditors Committee was
22 aligned with Notesan in contending that the WCI Group had enough cash
23 reserves not subject to any security interest in favor of AMP to fund
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25 ² Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the
26 Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.

1 an internal, stand-alone reorganization and ultimately pay creditors
2 in full. Accordingly, the Creditors Committee opposed the WCI
3 Group's Motion for a Bidding Procedures Order, and both the Creditors
4 Committee and Notesan opposed the settlements with AT&T and TyCom, as
5 selling long term capacity on the fiber optic cable network too
6 cheaply in one case, and selling off valuable property rights to a
7 competitor in the other. After substantial hearings, the court
8 ultimately approved the AT&T and TyCom settlements as in the best
9 interests of creditors. The Orders approving those settlements were
10 not appealed.

11 (C) The Auction Process

12 An auction process took place over two days, starting on
13 December 18, 2001. Out of that process, the WCI Group determined to
14 propose for approval a sale of stock to Neptune Communications, LLC
15 ("Neptune")³ through a plan of reorganization, rather than pursue a
16 § 363 sale of assets. The stock sale mechanism ostensibly would have
17 allowed Neptune to take advantage of the substantial net operating
18 loss carry-forwards held by the WCI Group, and thus increase the bid
19 amount that Neptune would pay.

20 A competitive bidder, General Communications, Inc. ("GCI"),
21 actually bid more than Neptune for the WCI Group assets. However,
22 Mr. Maib, in consultation with various creditor constituencies,
23

24 ³ The stock of the reorganized debtors is to be purchased by
25 Crest Communications Corporation ("Crest"), a Delaware corporation
26 and wholly owned subsidiary of Neptune. For convenience, "Neptune"
collectively will refer to Neptune and Crest unless otherwise noted.

1 determined that the Neptune bid was more attractive because it
2 represented a transaction that was more likely to close. A GCI
3 transaction to acquire the assets of the WCI Group was perceived as
4 presenting regulatory issues, primarily antitrust concerns, that
5 could delay and possibly derail a closing. Mr. Maib asked GCI to
6 waive regulatory approval as a condition to its acquisition of the
7 WCI Group assets, but GCI would not accept the regulatory risk.

8 Following the auction process, at Neptune's request, the WCI
9 Group sought the court's approval for a required incremental
10 competing bid increase of \$2.2 million, including a "topping fee" of
11 \$1.7 million payable to Neptune if it lost the ultimate bid. In
12 light of Neptune's costs in establishing itself in the role of
13 "stalking horse" for future competitive bids, and the relatively
14 small percentage of the minimum overbid requirement in comparison to
15 the overall amount of Neptune's bid, the court entered an Order
16 approving the requested overbid protection and the \$1.7 million
17 topping fee. Notesan appealed that Order.

18 (D) Appointment of Examiner

19 On January 4, 2002, the Creditors Committee filed a Motion for
20 Order Directing Appointment of Examiner, seeking the appointment of
21 an examiner to investigate and report on the WCI Group's claims and
22 causes of action against AMP. On January 23, 2002, Notesan filed a
23 motion joining in the Creditors Committee's request for the
24 appointment of an examiner. Although the Creditors Committee
25 ultimately withdrew its examiner motion, Notesan did not.

1 Following a hearing, the court entered an Order Directing
2 Appointment of Examiner on February 1, 2002, directing the Examiner
3 to investigate, analyze and evaluate the WCI Group's possible claims
4 against AMP and to report on whether the settlement of WCI Group
5 claims against AMP provided for in the WCI Group plan represented a
6 reasonable possible settlement within the range of possible
7 settlements that could be negotiated.⁴ Later, the Examiner's charge
8 was expanded to evaluate the settlement terms concerning the WCI
9 Group's claims against AMP included in the WCI Plan and testify
10 regarding his conclusions at the Confirmation Hearing. See WCI Ex.
11 29.

12 (E) Exclusivity and Competing Plans

13 The WCI Group's exclusive period to file a chapter 11 plan
14 under § 1121(b) initially was scheduled to terminate on or about
15 December 18, 2001, and the WCI Group requested an extension of the
16 exclusive period. The Creditors Committee and Notesan opposed any
17 extension.

18 Based in large part on the progress that Mr. Maib had made in
19 negotiating settlements with various substantial creditors and the
20 momentum that had been built for a WCI Group plan, the court
21 determined that an extension of the exclusive period would be in the
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23 ⁴ The Seattle law firm of Cairncross & Hempelmann, P.S. (the
24 "Cairncross Firm") was appointed as the Examiner, with shareholder
25 and director, John R. Rizzardi, primarily in charge of the Examiner
26 project. The Cairncross Firm and Mr. Rizzardi will be referred to
interchangeably herein as the "Examiner."

1 best interests of creditors and entered an Order extending the
2 exclusive period to January 29, 2002. The WCI Group filed its first
3 plan of reorganization within the extended deadline.

4 On February 26, 2002, a new player entered the scene:
5 Chandalar Communications, LLC ("Chandalar") submitted an initial
6 stock purchase proposal that offered \$9.5 million more than the
7 Neptune proposal around which the WCI Group plan was built. The WCI
8 Group exhibited little enthusiasm for the Chandalar proposal, citing
9 primarily regulatory concerns related to a business relationship
10 between Chandalar and GCI that could jeopardize closing of a
11 Chandalar transaction. Negotiations ensued between Chandalar and Mr.
12 Maib, with input from various creditor constituencies. However,
13 these negotiations neither resulted in the WCI Group embracing a
14 Chandalar bid nor obtaining an increase in the bid from Neptune.

15 With Chandalar offering more money and apparently shut out of
16 the plan process, and progress appearing to have stalled concerning
17 resolution of the outstanding contentious claims, the court
18 terminated exclusivity on April 8, 2002. At that time, it was clear
19 that the WCI Group would be presenting a plan for confirmation. On
20 April 19, 2002, Notesan and Chandalar each filed a competing plan
21 with the court. Chandalar withdrew its plan on April 24, 2002,
22 following GCI's termination of its business relationship with
23 Chandalar.

24 Ultimately, the court approved disclosure materials and
25 balloting for the WCI Plan and the Notesan Plan on May 3, 2002.
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1 Following the balloting, the WCI Plan and the Notesan Plan were
2 presented for confirmation at the Confirmation Hearing, but the
3 Notesan Plan was withdrawn on June 14, 2002, before the presentation
4 of testimony in support of confirmation of the Notesan Plan.

5 Jurisdiction

6 This court has jurisdiction over the matters presented for
7 determination at the Confirmation Hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
8 § 1334(a), under which the federal district courts have original and
9 exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11, and 28 U.S.C.
10 § 157(a), authorizing the district courts to refer all Title 11 cases
11 and proceedings to the bankruptcy judges for their respective
12 districts. Local Rule 2100-1 of the United States District Court for
13 the District of Oregon effectuates this reference. Plan
14 confirmations are proceedings within the core jurisdiction of
15 bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2) (L). Approvals of
16 settlements of bankruptcy estate claims are proceedings within the
17 core jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C.
18 §§ 157(b) (2) (A), (C) and/or (O).

19 Confirmation Standards

20 The requirements for confirmation of a plan of reorganization
21 in chapter 11 are set forth in § 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
22 court has an affirmative duty to make sure that all of the
23 requirements for confirmation under § 1129 have been met. In re
24 Ambanc La Mesa Ltd. Partnership, 115 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1997).
25 The court will confirm a plan if the plan proponent proves by a
26

preponderance of the evidence either 1) that all 13 requirements of § 1129(a) have been met, or 2) if the only condition to confirmation that is not satisfied is § 1129(a)(8), that the plan satisfies the standards for "cramdown" under § 1129(b), i.e., the plan "does not discriminate unfairly" against and is "fair and equitable" with regard to each impaired class that has not accepted the plan. Id.

Ballot Summaries

Under § 1126(c), a class of creditor claims votes to accept a plan if at least two-thirds in amount and a majority in number of class claimants who actually vote, cast votes in favor of the plan. In these cases, all impaired creditor classes in the WCI, Alaska Fiber Star, Alaska Northstar, Lightpoint and Hillsboro cases voted in favor of the WCI Plan.⁵

The classes of general nonpriority unsecured claims, other than the convenience classes, in the WCI, Alaska Fiber Star, Alaska Northstar, Lightpoint and Hillsboro cases voted as follows with respect to the WCI Plan:

	<u># Accepting</u>	<u># Rejecting</u>	<u>\$ Amount Accepting</u>	<u>\$ Amount Rejecting</u>
WCI	49	5	\$ 6,403,584.87 (94.7%)	\$360,254.73 (5.3%)
Alaska Fiber				

⁵ DeJon Corporation cast ballots voting to reject the WCI Plan in the WCI, Alaska Fiber Star and Lightpoint cases. However, during the course of the Confirmation Hearing, DeJon Corporation's claims against the WCI Group, AMP and Notesan were settled for \$1.4 million, contingent upon the WCI Plan being confirmed and the settlement being approved by the court. As part of the agreed settlement, DeJon Corporation changed its votes from rejection to acceptance of the WCI Plan in the Alaska Fiber Star and Lightpoint cases and withdrew its contested vote in the WCI case.

Star	20	2	\$ 948,440.22 (96.6%)	\$ 33,053.56 (3.4%)
Alaska Northstar	2	0	\$ 26,954,909.68 (100%)	\$ 0 (0%)
Lightpoint	2	0	\$ 3,363,497.83 (100%)	\$ 0 (0%)
Hillsboro	1	0	\$ 11,769.33 (100%)	\$ 0 (0%)

In the WorldNet case, two non-insider impaired classes, KeyBank and ultimately, DeJon Corporation, voted in favor of the WCI Plan. However, the class of general, nonpriority unsecured claims, including the claims of Notesan and its consultant, John Burns, rejected the WCI Plan by the following vote:

	<u># Accepting</u>	<u># Rejecting</u>	<u>\$ Amount Accepting</u>	<u>\$ Amount Rejecting</u>
WorldNet	1	3	\$ 13,285.73 (4.2%)	\$300,733.80 (95.8%)

Accordingly, assuming the WCI Plan satisfies the other requirements for confirmation of § 1129(a), the WCI Plan will have to meet the "cramdown" requirements of § 1129(b) with respect to the claims of general nonpriority unsecured claims in at least the WorldNet case.

Uncontested Issues

At the Confirmation Hearing, no issues were raised as to the WCI Plan satisfying the requirements of §§ 1129(a)(2), (4), (5), (9), (10) and (12). Accordingly, I find, consistent with the testimony of Mr. Maib and the other evidence submitted in support of confirmation of the WCI Plan, that the requirements of §§ 1129(a)(2), (4), (5), (9), (10) and (12) have been met. In addition, it is not contested that the requirements of §§ 1129(a)(6) and (13) are inapplicable in these cases. Objections to confirmation of the WCI Plan and the testimony and argument presented at the Confirmation Hearing focused on the other requirements of § 1129(a).

Compliance with Applicable Provisions

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1 The objections initially argue that Sections 15.5 and 15.6 of
2 the WCI Plan provide for nondebtor releases and injunctions, which
3 are impermissible under § 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.⁷ They rely
4 heavily on the decision of the Ninth Circuit in In re Lowenschuss, 67
5 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1995), which clearly holds that bankruptcy courts

6
7
8 ⁶(...continued)
9 Releasees including without limitation any possible claims, suits
10 and/or Causes of Action (i) challenging the validity, perfection,
11 extent and priority of the AMP Claims and Liens asserted by AMP; (ii)
12 seeking equitable subordination of AMP Claims; (iii) seeking
13 recharacterization of AMP Claims as equity interests; (iv)
14 constituting and/or alleging lender liability, breach of fiduciary
15 duty, conversion, breach of contract, tortious interference with
16 contract or prospective contract or business relations, veil
17 piercing, alter ego, fraud, constructive fraud and/or substantive
18 consolidation claims, and (v) that the Debtors have alleged or might
19 have alleged against any AMP Releasee relating to or arising out of
20 AMP's involvement with the Debtors up to and including the Effective
21 Date.

22 15.6 Injunction. On and after the Effective Date, all holders
23 of a Claim against or Interest in the Debtors, and all other parties
24 in interest in the Bankruptcy Cases, shall be permanently enjoined
25 from (a) asserting against any AMP Releasee, or (b) commencing,
26 conducting or continuing in any manner, directly or indirectly, any
suit, action or other proceeding of any kind against any AMP Releasee
or property of any AMP Releasee, that would have the effect of
asserting against any AMP Releasee or any AMP Releasee's property,
any claim, liability or Cause of Action covered by Section 15.5 of
this Plan.

24
25 ⁷ Section 524(e) provides in relevant part that "...discharge of
26 a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other
entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt."

1 do not have the equitable power under § 105(a)⁸ to discharge the
2 liabilities of nondebtors through chapter 11 plan confirmation,
3 contrary to the provisions of § 524(e). Id. at 1401-02.

4 I agree that it is inappropriate to use § 105(a) substantively
5 to effect results that are inconsistent with other provisions of the
6 Bankruptcy Code. As stated by the Third Circuit in In re Continental
7 Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000):

8 "Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supplements
9 courts' specifically enumerated bankruptcy powers by
10 authorizing orders necessary or appropriate to carry
11 out provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. However,
12 section 105(a) has a limited scope. It does not
13 'create substantive rights that would otherwise be
14 unavailable under the Bankruptcy Code.' United States
15 v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 131 (3rd Cir. 1992)."

16 See also In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 14 (Bankr. N.D.
17 Okla. 1998).

18 However, in these cases, the § 524(e) argument raised by the
19 objections misses the point. The claims that the WCI Group propose
20 to release in section 15.5 of the WCI Plan are solely WCI Group
21 claims. They are assets of the WCI Group bankrupt estates. See,
22 e.g., In re Folks, 211 B.R. 378, 384 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) ("Once the
23 bankruptcy petition is filed property rights which belong to the
24 debtor become assets of the estate. § 541(a)(1). Thus, a right of
25 action which is property of the debtor becomes property of the
26

⁸ Section 105(a) provides: "The court may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title...."

1 estate."). No direct claims of third parties against any of the AMP
2 Releasees are proposed to be released. The injunction provisions of
3 section 15.6 enjoin interested parties only from pursuing claims of
4 the WCI Group that are to be released pursuant to section 15.5. The
5 pursuit of such parties' direct claims against any of the AMP
6 Releasees is not enjoined.

7 1. Releases and Injunctions as Provisions of Proposed
8 Settlement

9 I find that the release and injunction provisions of sections
10 15.5 and 15.6 of the WCI Plan are submitted for approval by the court
11 pursuant to § 1123(b)(3)(A) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a).

12 Section 1123(b)(3)(A) specifically provides that a chapter 11 plan
13 may provide for the settlement of any claim belonging to the debtor

14 ///

15 ///

16 ///

17 or to the estate.⁹

18 The proposed settlement with AMP and the AMP Releasees (the
19 "AMP Settlement") was noticed for approval to all interested parties
20 in the WCI Plan and in the accompanying disclosure statement.¹⁰ To

21
22 ⁹ Section 1123(b)(3)(A) provides that "...a plan may...provide
23 for...the settlement or adjustment of any claim or interest belonging
24 to the debtor or to the estate...."

25 ¹⁰ Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a) provides that, "On motion by the
26 (continued...)

1 the extent that the authority of § 105(a) is invoked to approve the
2 provisions of sections 15.5 and 15.6 of the WCI Plan, its use is
3 limited to providing supplemental authority for the enforcement of a
4 settlement that otherwise is subject to the court's approval under
5 § 1123(b)(3)(A). Section 105(a) can be used with respect to the
6 injunction provisions of the WCI Plan only to the extent necessary
7 and appropriate to carry out the terms of an approved settlement.
8 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 478 (Bankr. E.D.
9 Mich. 2000); In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc., 113 B.R. 610, 615
10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) ("...section 105 permits the court to issue
11 both preliminary and permanent injunctions after confirmation of a
12 plan to protect the debtor and the administration of the bankruptcy
13 estate").

14 2. Standards for Approval of the Proposed Settlement

15 Accordingly, the issue then becomes whether it is appropriate
16 to approve the AMP Settlement. The standards for approval of a
17 settlement of claims in bankruptcy are discussed at length in In re A
18 & C Properties, 784 F.2d 1377, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1986). A debtor-in-
19 possession has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence
20 to establish that a proposed settlement is reasonable, adequate, fair
21 and equitable. "In determining the fairness, reasonableness and
22 adequacy of a proposed settlement agreement, the court must consider:
23

24 ¹⁰ (...continued)
25 [debtor-in-possession] and after notice and a hearing, the court may
26 approve a compromise or settlement."

1 (a) the probability of success in the litigation; (b) the
2 difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of collection;
3 (c) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense,
4 inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; (d) the paramount
5 interest of the creditors and a proper deference to their reasonable
6 views in the premises." Id. at 1381.

7 3. The Proposed Settlement

8 This is the point where Notesan's argument that this case is
9 essentially all about a shareholder dispute has the most resonance.
10 AMP has asserted secured and unsecured claims in excess of
11 \$270,000,000 in the WCI Group bankruptcy cases. Notesan has objected
12 to AMP's claims and disputes them bitterly. Under the WCI Plan, as
13 proposed at the outset of the Confirmation Hearing, in exchange for
14 the release and injunction provisions of sections 15.5 and 15.6, AMP
15 is to be recognized as having two allowed nonpriority unsecured
16 claims, a Primary AMP Settled Claim in the amount of \$50.5 million
17 and a Residual AMP Settled Claim in the amount of \$179.95 million.
18 AMP's allowed claims, in a total amount approximating its total
19 alleged advances of principal to the WCI Group, would supersede AMP's
20 filed claims in the WCI Group bankruptcies.

21 While the AMP claims allowed under the WCI Plan reflect a
22 substantial discount from the claims filed by AMP, the most
23 substantial consideration offered by AMP for the release and
24 injunction provisions of the WCI Plan was AMP's agreement effectively
25 to subordinate its right to receive any payment under the WCI Plan
26

1 until other unsecured creditors, including Alcatel, had received
2 total distributions of \$30.8 million, estimated to represent a
3 distribution of approximately 82.5 cents on the dollar. Thereafter,
4 AMP was projected to receive distributions totaling approximately
5 \$40.548 million. See WCI Ex. 20. Accordingly, AMP was projected as
6 never receiving any distribution on its Residual AMP Settled Claim.
7 However, AMP would receive the right to a priority distribution of
8 the first \$5 million recovered from litigation of the WCI Group's
9 claims against Notesan and affiliated entities, including Mr.
10 Hudspeth (the "Designated Litigation Claims"), to be applied against
11 the Residual AMP Settled Claim, and the Designated Litigation Claims
12 cannot be settled without the prior written consent of AMP.

13 During the Confirmation Hearing, in light of events discussed
14 at pp. 48-50 infra, AMP agreed to alter its treatment under the WCI
15 Plan in two important respects: (1) AMP agreed to transfer up to \$2
16 million of the distributions on its Primary AMP Settled Claim to
17 general unsecured creditors other than Alcatel to meet the WCI
18 Group's estimates of the amount required to achieve a 100%
19 distribution to such creditors, plus up to \$1 million to distribute
20 to such creditors should their claims exceed the WCI Group's
21 estimates; and (2) AMP agreed to transfer \$700,000 of the
22 distributions on its Primary AMP Settled Claim to DeJon Corporation
23 to fund one half of the proposed DeJon Corporation settlement.
24 Accordingly, under the WCI Plan, as so amended, payment of any amount
25 to AMP on its allowed claims is effectively subordinated to a 100%
26

1 distribution to general unsecured creditors other than Alcatel, which
2 has agreed to a full settlement of its claim, based on an 82.5%
3 distribution on its allowed claim. See discussion at pp. 30-33
4 infra.

5 4. Application of the Standards for Approval to the Proposed
6 Settlement

7 The collectibility of any judgment or claim against AMP is
8 uncontested. Accordingly, collectibility is not a material factor to
9 be considered with respect to the proposed AMP Settlement.

10 (a) Mr. Maib's Analysis

11 Mr. Maib testified at length at the Confirmation Hearing
12 concerning his investigation of the WCI Group's potential claims
13 against AMP. He testified that his investigation of those claims
14 began almost immediately after his employment by the WCI Group. He
15 testified that he had the WCI Group's legal counsel investigate
16 potential claims of the WCI Group against AMP, which encompassed
17 possible claims in the following areas: (1) validity, extent and
18 priority of security interests; (2) equitable subordination; (3)
19 conversion of debt to equity; (4) breach of promise to convert debt
20 to equity; (5) lender liability; and (6) breach of fiduciary duties,
21 breach of promise(s) to fund, alter ego and piercing the corporate
22 veil. He further testified that his investigation encompassed claims
23 against AMP Henderson and Marcus Derwin.

24 He and his counsel reviewed thousands of documents and
25 conducted a number of interviews during the course of their
26

1 investigations. See WCI Exs. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. He also
2 requested input from other interested parties in evaluating the WCI
3 Group's potential claims against AMP. See, e.g., WCI Ex. 18. He did
4 not file litigation against AMP because he felt that initiating such
5 litigation early in the WCI Group bankruptcy cases would be
6 counterproductive. Accordingly, he did not initiate any formal
7 discovery proceedings against AMP. However, he was careful to
8 preserve the WCI Group's rights to challenge the extent, validity and
9 priority of AMP's claimed security interests in WCI Group assets in
10 the cash collateral orders entered early in the WCI Group cases.

11 Mr. Maib believes that one of his strengths is in evaluating
12 significant claims quickly, and he determined early in the WCI Group
13 bankruptcy process that negotiating a settlement with AMP would be
14 vital to the best interests of creditors in order to preserve asset
15 values in a deteriorating business environment. He further testified
16 that he felt his investigation was adequate to reveal and analyze all
17 material claims of the WCI Group against AMP.

18 Notesan challenges the adequacy of the investigations of the
19 WCI Group's potential claims against AMP conducted by Mr. Maib and
20 the WCI Group counsel because: (1) no formal discovery was conducted;
21 (2) Mr. Maib and his counsel relied on voluntary productions of
22 documents from AMP to gather relevant documents from AMP; and (3) Mr.
23 Maib and WCI Group counsel only conducted a limited number of
24 interviews of witnesses from the many witnesses who might have
25 provided material information. See, e.g., WCI Ex. 17, Tab 1, p. 1.
26

1 Notesan also faults Mr. Maib for not adequately investigating
2 potential claims against the individuals and entities affiliated with
3 AMP included among the AMP Releasees. Ultimately, Notesan argues
4 that Mr. Maib gave up immensely valuable claims against AMP and its
5 affiliates in a settlement too early, based upon an inadequate
6 investigation.

7 From his investigation, Mr. Maib considered the WCI Group's
8 equitable subordination claims against AMP to be very strong, but not
9 likely to result in summary judgment in the WCI Group's favor if
10 litigation were initiated. He also concluded that AMP was not in a
11 strong position to establish the validity of its alleged security
12 interests in WCI Group assets. He did not perceive the WCI Group's
13 cause of action for recharacterization of AMP's debt to equity as
14 viable. See, e.g., In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115
15 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). He further concluded that the WCI Group's
16 other potential causes of action against AMP had a relatively low
17 probability of success. Mr. Maib testified that he considers the WCI
18 Group's potential claims against AMP to involve very complex causes
19 of action, of uncertain potential outcome over an extended period if
20 litigated to a conclusion.

21 Generally Mr. Maib's analysis is reflected in the amended
22 version of the WCI Plan that is before me for confirmation: AMP is
23 not recognized as having any secured claim against assets of members
24 of the WCI Group, and payment of AMP's claims is effectively
25 subordinated to payment of the claims of other general nonpriority
26

1 unsecured creditors. However, AMP is to have allowed unsecured
2 claims in the approximate total amount of the principal of advances
3 made by AMP to the WCI Group.

4 (b) The Examiner's Analysis

5 As previously discussed at pp. 10-11 supra, an Examiner was
6 appointed on Notesan's motion in these cases to investigate, analyze
7 and evaluate the WCI Group's potential claims against AMP and to
8 determine if the settlement with AMP included in the WCI Plan
9 represents a reasonable possible settlement in light of potential
10 settlements that could be negotiated. In effect, the Examiner was
11 appointed to provide a reality check on the adequacy of Mr. Maib's
12 investigation of the WCI Group claims against AMP and to provide an
13 independent evaluation of those claims in light of Notesan's spoken
14 and unspoken criticisms of Mr. Maib to the effect that he was tainted
15 by his employment by and association with a Board of WCI and a WCI
16 Group management team that had among their numbers AMP employees on
17 secondment.

18 The Examiner had a limited period to conduct his
19 investigation, and thus, his investigation could not be exhaustive.
20 However, he encouraged submissions from a large number of interested
21 parties, many of whom responded. He and his partners reviewed
22 thousands of documents. See, e.g., WCI Ex. 17, WCI Ex. 22, pp. 68-
23 112, and AMP Ex. 45. The Examiner heard presentations from a number
24 of parties, including the WCI Group and its counsel, Notesan and its
25 counsel, AMP and its counsel, counsel for the Creditors Committee,
26

1 and DeJon Corporation. The Examiner conducted 38 witness interviews.
2 See WCI Ex. 22, pp. 64-66. I find that the Examiner's Report was
3 professionally, conscientiously and thoughtfully prepared.

4 Based upon his investigation, the Examiner concluded that it
5 was highly likely that the WCI Group would prevail on its equitable
6 subordination claims against AMP but did not agree with Notesan that
7 the WCI Group was certain to prevail on those claims. See WCI Ex.
8 22, p. 16. The Examiner basically agreed with the WCI Group's
9 conclusion that AMP's alleged security interests in assets of the WCI
10 Group were not properly perfected. Id. at 19. The Examiner further
11 agreed with the WCI Group that a cause of action to recharacterize
12 the WCI Group's alleged debt to AMP to equity was not viable in the
13 WCI Group bankruptcy cases. Id. at 15. The Examiner regarded the
14 WCI Group's alter ego and piercing the corporate veil claims against
15 AMP as generally weak. Id. at 29-32. In his report, the Examiner
16 devoted substantial attention to the pros and cons of the WCI Group's
17 lender liability claims against AMP and ultimately concluded that the
18 WCI Group would be highly likely to prevail on such claims, but
19 cautioned that the factual basis for such claims would be hotly
20 contested. Id. at 33-45, 58. In his report, the Examiner further
21 stated that he did not believe that AMP caused the filing by the WCI
22 Group of their bankruptcy petitions or "that AMP dictated the hiring
23 of" Mr. Maib. Id. at 58.

24 The Examiner concluded that summary judgment would not likely
25 be granted in favor of the WCI Group on any of its claims against
26

1 AMP. Id. He further concluded that the cost and complexity of
2 litigating the WCI Group's claims against AMP would be "extremely
3 high," and "the litigation would likely involve dozens of attorneys,
4 numerous depositions of witnesses who are located around the world,
5 multiple expert witnesses and the production of tens of thousands, if
6 not hundreds of thousands, of pages of documents." Id. at 59. The
7 Examiner estimated that fighting such litigation through to a
8 conclusion would take "at least two to four years," including
9 appeals. Id. He also concluded that most of the creditors were in
10 favor of the AMP Settlement. He determined that in evaluating the A
11 & C Properties factors, the probability of success on the merits,
12 considered in isolation, militated against the proposed settlement.
13 However, when the costs, complexity and delays inherent in continued
14 litigation, the wishes of unsecured creditors, with the exception of
15 Notesan, and the deteriorating state of the telecommunications
16 industry were added into consideration, his ultimate conclusion was
17 that the proposed settlement with AMP was fair and equitable and in
18 the best interests of creditors.

19 The Examiner testified at the Confirmation Hearing that in
20 light of the changes to the WCI Plan made since his report was
21 prepared, "the settlement and the result was practically
22 unprecedented with regards to the return to unsecured creditors in a
23 case of this nature," and "we support it." Tr., Vol. 3, p. 432.
24 Although admitting under cross examination by Notesan's counsel that
25 he had not focused on potential claims against affiliates of AMP
26

1 included among the AMP Releasees in his investigation, he testified
2 that no substantial information with regard to such causes of action
3 had been presented to him during the course of his investigation that
4 he could recall. He further testified that if such causes of action
5 had been discussed during the course of that portion of Notesan's
6 presentation from which he was absent, he would have heard about such
7 causes of action from his partners if they had been identified.

8 (c) The Court's Analysis

9 In light of the evidence presented by Mr. Maib and the
10 Examiner in testimony, and further based upon the other evidence
11 included in the record for the Confirmation Hearing, I find that the
12 WCI Group likely would prevail on one or more causes of action
13 against AMP if the WCI Group's claims against AMP were litigated to a
14 conclusion. However, I bear in mind that even the WCI Group's
15 arguably strongest cause of action, for equitable subordination, is
16 based upon the application of equitable principles that might result
17 in only a partial subordination of AMP's claims if the WCI Group
18 prevails.

19 I find that the WCI Group's potential claims against AMP
20 involve very complex causes of action that are unlikely to be
21 resolved on summary judgment. I further find that monumental
22 discovery within and outside of the United States would be required
23 to prepare the WCI Group's causes of action against AMP for trial. I
24 also am aware from the highly contentious proceedings in these cases
25 to date, that pretrial proceedings among the WCI Group, AMP and
26

1 Notesan would be both vigorously contested and wearily protracted.
2 The Examiner noted that the parties appeared to be extremely
3 contentious, and virtually every witness he interviewed appeared to
4 be biased toward one side or the other. I further note that these
5 parties play for keeps and do not give quarter. I agree with the
6 Examiner and find that litigating the WCI Group claims against AMP
7 through trial and the inevitable appeal(s) would take years.

8 The ballot summaries discussed at pp. 13-15 supra reflect that
9 unsecured creditors have voted overwhelmingly for the WCI Plan,
10 including the AMP Settlement, even before AMP agreed to transfer its
11 rights to distributions so that general unsecured creditors other
12 than Alcatel would receive an estimated 100% of their allowed claims
13 before AMP received any distribution. During the final arguments at
14 the Confirmation Hearing, Notesan stood alone in opposing
15 confirmation of the amended WCI Plan.

16 The WCI Plan effectively subordinates any payment to AMP to
17 estimated 100% distributions to unsecured creditors, while allowing
18 Notesan to retain and litigate its direct claims against AMP. If I
19 do not approve the AMP Settlement, creditors are potentially left
20 with the prospect of sitting back helplessly, hoping that the jackpot
21 is hit, while the WCI Group assets face an uncertain future in a
22 deteriorating environment. In these circumstances, I find that Mr.
23 Maib proposed the AMP Settlement in the WCI Plan in a reasonable
24 exercise of his business judgment, that the consideration provided by
25 AMP under the AMP Settlement is adequate, and that the AMP Settlement
26

1 is fair and equitable. Accordingly, I am prepared to approve the AMP
2 Settlement as consistent with the requirements of the Bankruptcy
3 Code.

4 B. The Alcatel Settlement

5 Section 2.4 of the WCI Plan provides that as of the effective
6 date of the plan, each member of the WCI Group shall release any and
7 all claims against Alcatel, and Alcatel shall have an allowed
8 nonpriority general unsecured claim in the amount of \$26.183 million
9 that will receive an estimated 82.5 cents on the dollar distribution
10 under the WCI Plan. In addition, Alcatel and AMP will release one
11 another and their respective affiliates from claims in any way
12 relating to the WCI Group and their respective businesses. The
13 proposed Alcatel settlement was noticed for approval pursuant to
14 § 1123(b)(3)(A) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a) to all interested
15 parties in the WCI Plan and disclosure statement.

16 Mr. Maib explained during the course of his testimony that
17 Alcatel had worked on the Alaska Northstar cable system, and the
18 original unpaid obligation to Alcatel was \$25 million, which had
19 increased to the claim amount to be allowed through the accrual of
20 interest. In Mr. Maib's view, based on the advice of counsel, any
21 disputes between Alcatel and Alaska Northstar under the original
22 Engineering and Procurement Agreement between them, dated December 5,
23 1997 (the "EPC Agreement"), had been effectively waived through the
24 provisions of Section 9.15 of the Deferred Payment Agreement between
25 Alcatel and Alaska Northstar, dated May 12, 1999 (the "Deferred
26

1 Payment Agreement").

2 Section 9.15 of the Deferred Payment Agreement provides as
3 follows: "Absolute Obligation. [Alaska Northstar] agrees that its
4 obligation to make all of the payments under this Agreement are
5 absolute and unconditional and are not subject to any deduction,
6 counterclaim, defense or set-off of any kind or nature against any
7 amounts that might be owed from time to time to [Alaska Northstar] by
8 (I) [Alcatel], or (ii) or any other Person." See WCI Ex. 26, pp. 27-
9 28.

10 Accordingly, in negotiating with Alcatel, Mr. Maib felt that
11 he had little in the way of substantive defenses to the Alcatel
12 claim, based upon the lack of any substantial commercial activity
13 between the WCI Group and Alcatel subsequent to the parties entering
14 into the Deferred Payment Agreement. He negotiated the best discount
15 that he could get from full payment of the Alcatel claim. He further
16 testified that his negotiation of the proposed settlement with
17 Alcatel paved the way for securing the support of other unsecured
18 creditors for the 82.5 cents on the dollar estimated distribution
19 under the WCI Plan as proposed prior to the Confirmation Hearing.
20 Alcatel stands by its acceptance of the 82.5% estimated distribution
21 under the WCI Plan and will not benefit from the transfer of
22 distributions from AMP that will allow other general nonpriority
23 unsecured creditors to receive an estimated 100% distribution on
24 their allowed claims.

25 The settlement provisions between Alcatel and AMP concern
26

1 primarily Alcatel's claim that AMP provided a written guarantee of
2 payment of Alcatel's claims against Alaska Northstar. AMP contends
3 that any such promise of payment, to the extent it exists, relates to
4 Alaska Northstar's obligations under the EPC Agreement and has no
5 application to the Deferred Payment Agreement that effectively
6 superseded the EPC Agreement.

7 On cross-examination, Notesan attempted to make the points
8 through Mr. Maib that Section 9.15 of the Deferred Payment Agreement
9 is not worded conventionally as a release of claims, and that Alaska
10 Northstar may have substantial unresolved claims against Alcatel that
11 would not be preserved through the proposed settlement. Counsel for
12 Alcatel countered that the disclosure materials for the Notesan Plan
13 contained no description of any such extant claims against Alcatel.
14 In addition, I note that the Deferred Payment Agreement was entered
15 into during Mr. Hudspeth's tenure as CEO of the WCI Group. Mr.
16 Hudspeth was present in the courtroom during Mr. Maib's testimony
17 with respect to the proposed settlement with Alcatel. However,
18 Notesan did not call Mr. Hudspeth as a witness in support of its
19 objections to the WCI Plan to present any interpretation of Section
20 9.15 of the Deferred Payment Agreement that differed from Mr. Maib's.

21 Based upon the evidence presented, I find Mr. Maib's
22 interpretation of Section 9.15 of the Deferred Payment Agreement and
23 its impact to be reasonable. I further find that the proposed
24 settlement with Alcatel set forth in Section 2.4 of the WCI Plan
25 reflects the best deal that could be negotiated by the WCI Group with
26

1 Alcatel under the circumstances of these cases and reflects the
2 exercise of reasonable business judgment by Mr. Maib. I further find
3 that the consideration received by the WCI Group in terms of the
4 discounted settlement distribution to Alcatel is adequate, and I find
5 that the proposed settlement with Alcatel is fair and equitable and
6 is in the best interests of creditors and the WCI Group estates.

7 C. Settlement of Intercompany Claims

8 Section 2.5 of the WCI Plan provides that as of the effective
9 date of the plan, all claims between and among the various members of
10 the WCI Group shall be deemed set off against one another, and WCI
11 shall receive new membership interests in its limited liability
12 company affiliates in the WCI Group (Alaska Fiber Star, Alaska
13 Northstar, Lightpoint and Hillsboro), as provided for in Section 5.11
14 of the WCI Plan. The proposed settlement of intercompany claims (the
15 "Intercompany Settlement") was noticed to all interested parties for
16 approval by the court pursuant to § 1123(b)(3)(A) and Fed. R. Bankr.
17 P. 9019(a) in the WCI Plan and disclosure statement.

18 Mr. Maib testified that he had investigated the various
19 intercompany claims among the WCI Group and determined that they were
20 poorly and incompletely documented in the records of the WCI Group.
21 In light of the difficulties in accurately reconstructing and
22 appropriately documenting the intercompany transactions among members
23 of the WCI Group, particularly in light of personnel changes that
24 limited institutional memory, Mr. Maib testified that the effort
25 required to sort out intercompany transactions fully would not be
26

1 cost effective. See also WCI Ex. 9. Accordingly, he proposed the
2 Intercompany Settlement in the exercise of his business judgment, as
3 in the best interests of creditors.

4 His recommendation of the Intercompany Settlement was not
5 challenged during the course of the Confirmation Hearing and was not
6 opposed in any of the filed objections to the WCI Plan. Accordingly,
7 based on the evidence before me, I find that the proposed
8 Intercompany Settlement incorporated in the WCI Plan is fair and
9 equitable and in the best interests of creditors and other interested
10 parties.

11 D. The Creditors Committee Exculpation

12 Section 11.3 of the WCI Plan (the "Creditors Committee
13 Exculpation Clause") limits the liability of Creditors Committee
14 members and their agents, other than Notesan and its officers,
15 directors, employees and agents, for any of their actions or
16 omissions to act with respect to the WCI Group bankruptcy
17 proceedings, except for willful misconduct or ultra vires acts.¹¹

19 ¹¹ Section 11.3 of the WCI Plan specifically provides as
20 follows: "Exculpation of Creditors' Committee and its Agents.
21 Neither the Creditors' Committee nor any of its past or present
22 members (other than Notesan) nor any of their respective past or
23 present officers, directors, employees, or agents during the
24 Bankruptcy Cases (other than Notesan and its officers, directors,
25 employees and agents), shall have or incur any liability to any
26 holder of a Claim or Interest or to any other Entity for any act or
omission in connection with, or arising out of, the Bankruptcy Cases,
negotiation and pursuit of confirmation of this Plan or the
consummation of this Plan, or the administration of this Plan or the
(continued...)

1 During final argument at the Confirmation Hearing, counsel for the
2 Creditors Committee confirmed that the limitation of liability
3 provided for in the Creditors Committee Exculpation Clause did not
4 extend to Creditors Committee professionals, including Creditors
5 Committee counsel.

6 The United States Trustee objected to the Creditors Committee
7 Exculpation Clause as a gratuitous provision that should be rejected
8 to the extent that it could be interpreted as enhancing liability
9 protections for members of the Creditors Committee beyond the
10 immunity for official acts of creditors' committees implicit in
11 § 1103(c).¹²

12 I am persuaded by the reasoning of the Third Circuit in In re
13 PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 245-47 (3d Cir. 2000), that the
14 _____

15 ¹¹ (...continued)
16 property to be distributed under this Plan except for willful
17 misconduct or ultra vires acts."

18 ¹² Section 1103(c) provides: "A committee appointed under
19 section 1102 of this title may 1) consult with the trustee or debtor
20 in possession concerning the administration of the case; 2)
21 investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial
22 condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and
23 the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other
24 matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan; 3)
25 participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented by
26 such committee of such committee's determinations as to any plan
formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or
rejections of a plan; 4) request the appointment of a trustee or
examiner under section 1104 of this title; and 5) perform such other
services as are in the interest of those represented."

1 Creditors Committee Exculpation Clause does not provide a prohibited
2 release of nondebtor liability, but in fact does no more than state
3 clearly the appropriate standard for immunity of Creditors Committee
4 members in performing their functions under § 1103(c). Accordingly,
5 I find that the Creditors Committee Exculpation Clause is outside of
6 the scope of § 524(e). Also see, e.g., Vasconi & Assoc., Inc. v.
7 Credit Manager Ass'n of California, 1997 WL 383170 (N.D.Cal. July 1,
8 1997); and In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 717,
9 722 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).

10 I am mindful of the United States Trustee's concern that a
11 restatement of statutory immunity in a chapter 11 plan is subject to
12 abuse in terms of expanding limitations of liability beyond any
13 immunity provided for in the Bankruptcy Code. However, I also am
14 sensitive to the concerns expressed by counsel for the Creditors
15 Committee at the final argument that the terms of the Creditors
16 Committee members' liability limitations be clearly and expressly
17 stated in light of the contentious nature of proceedings in these
18 bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group,
19 Inc., 138 B.R. at 722 ("We believe that far from supporting its
20 arguments against the release and injunction provisions, LBA's pique
21 underscores the need for them.").

22 I find that the limitation of liability provisions for
23 Creditors Committee members and their agents, other than
24 professionals, included in the Creditors Committee Exculpation Clause
25 cover no more and no less than the limited immunity for creditors'

1 committee members performing their functions under the Bankruptcy
2 Code contemplated in § 1103(c). Accordingly, I find that the
3 Creditors Committee Exculpation Clause complies with, and is not
4 inconsistent with, applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

5 E. Exculpation and Injunction Provisions Concerning the WCI
6 Group and the WCI Trust

7 Section 15.2 of the WCI Plan (the "WCI Group Exculpation
8 Clause") essentially limits the liability of the WCI Group, the
9 Trustee and Board of Directors of the WCI Trust to be formed pursuant
10 to the WCI Plan, and their respective officers, directors, employees
11 and agents, including professionals, for any of their actions or
12 omissions to act with respect to the WCI Group bankruptcy
13 proceedings, except for willful misconduct or gross negligence.¹³

14
15 ¹³ Section 15.2 of the WCI Plan provides as follows:
16 "Exculpation of the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors, the Trustee,
17 the WCIC [sic] Trust Board and Their Respective Agents. None of the
18 Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors, the Trustee, and the WCI Trust
19 Board, nor any of their respective officers, members, directors,
20 employees, representatives, attorneys, accountants, financial
21 advisors, or agents who were or in the future are officers, members,
22 directors, employees, representatives, attorneys, accountants,
23 financial advisors, or agents, as the case may be, during the
24 Bankruptcy Cases or while this Plan is being administered shall have
25 or incur any liability to any holder of a Claim or Interest, or to
26 any other Entity for any act or omission in connection with, or
arising out of the Bankruptcy Cases, the pursuit of confirmation of
the Plan, the consummation of the Plan, or the administration of the
Plan, or the property to be distributed under the Plan including,
without limitation, failure to obtain confirmation of the Plan or to
satisfy any condition or conditions, or refusal to waive any

(continued...)

1 At the Confirmation Hearing, counsel for the WCI Group stated that
2 Section 15.2 of the WCI Plan would be amended to clarify that its
3 provisions relate only to postpetition acts of the subject persons
4 and entities. Section 15.4 of the WCI Plan (the "WCI Group
5 Injunction") essentially provides for an injunction against acts of
6 persons or entities holding claims and/or equity interests with
7 respect to the WCI Group from pursuing claims against the WCI Group,
8 the WCI Trust or their successors in interest except as consistent
9 with provisions of the WCI Plan.¹⁴

11 ¹³ (...continued)
12 condition or conditions, to the occurrence of the Effective Date,
13 except for willful misconduct or gross negligence, and, in all
14 respects, the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors, the Trustee and the
15 WCI Trust Board and each of their respective members, officers,
16 directors, employees and agents shall be entitled to rely upon the
17 advice of counsel with respect to their duties and responsibilities
18 under the Plan; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not
19 supersede the 'safe harbor' from liability provided by Section
20 1125(e) of the Bankruptcy Code."

19 ¹⁴ Section 15.4 of the WCI Plan provides as follows:
20 "Injunction. Except as otherwise provided in the Plan, upon entry of
21 the Confirmation Order, all Entities that have held, hold or may hold
22 Claims against or Interests in the Debtors are, with respect to any
23 such Claims or Interests, permanently enjoined from and after the
24 Confirmation Date from: (a) commencing, conducting or continuing in
25 any manner, directly or indirectly, any suit, action or other
26 proceeding of any kind (including, without limitation, any proceeding
in a judicial, arbitral, administrative or other forum) against or
affecting the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors, or the WCI Trust, any
of their respective property, or any direct or indirect transferee of
(continued...)

1 1. Exculpation Provisions

2 These related but distinct provisions of the WCI Plan raise
3 issues beyond the simple restatement of statutory immunity provided
4 by the Creditors Committee Exculpation Clause, discussed at pp. 34-36
5 supra. The WCI Group Exculpation Clause is particularly problematic
6 because it establishes one standard of liability for postpetition

7 _____
8 ¹⁴ (...continued)
9 any property of, or direct or indirect successor in interest to, the
10 Debtors, or any property of any such transferee or successor; (b)
11 enforcing, levying, attaching (including, without limitation, any
12 pre-judgment attachment), collecting or otherwise recovering by any
13 manner or means, whether directly or indirectly, any judgment, award,
14 decree or order against the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors or the
15 WCI Trust, any of their respective property, or any direct or
16 indirect transferee of any property of, or direct or indirect
17 successor in interest to, the Debtors, or any property of any such
18 transferee or successor; (c) creating, perfecting or otherwise
19 enforcing in any manner, directly or indirectly, any encumbrance of
20 any kind against the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors or the WCI
21 Trust, any of their respective property, or any direct or indirect
22 transferee of any property of, or successor in interest to, any of
23 the foregoing Entities; (d) asserting any right of setoff,
24 subrogation, or recoupment of any kind, directly or indirectly,
25 against any obligation due the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors or
26 the WCI Trust, any of their respective property, or any direct or
indirect transferee of any property of, or successor in interest to,
the Debtors; (e) exercising any provision contained in any contract,
lease or instrument which was entered into by any of the Debtors
prior to the Petition Date and which is not cancelled or rejected
under this Plan that allows a Creditor to declare, or that declares,
a default based on the commencement of the Bankruptcy Cases, the
insolvency or financial condition of the Debtors or the subjective
insecurity of such Creditor; and (f) acting or proceeding in any
manner, in any place whatsoever, that does not conform to or comply
with the provisions of the Plan.”

1 conduct, limited to willful misconduct and gross negligence, for the
2 WCI Group entities and their officers and agents, fiduciaries of the
3 WCI Trust, and their professionals. Different liability standards
4 may be appropriate and/or applicable under the Bankruptcy Code to
5 these different entities and individuals in various circumstances in
6 performing their respective functions postpetition in bankruptcy, and
7 the lines separating actions protected by immunity from actionable
8 conduct are neither clearly nor easily drawn. See, e.g., In re
9 Castillo, 248 B.R. 153, 157 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) ("The courts use a
10 functional approach to determine whether a nonjudicial officer is
11 entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity, looking to the nature
12 of the function performed and not the identity of the actor
13 performing it."); and In re Kashani, 190 B.R. 875, 883 (B.A.P. 9th
14 Cir. 1995) ("While a trustee is allowed to make reasonable mistakes
15 where discretion is allowed, a trustee may be sued for intentional or
16 negligent actions which amount to violations of the duties imposed
17 upon the trustee by law.").

18 The decisions in this area have arrived at varied and often
19 inconsistent results. However, in general, decisions in the Ninth
20 Circuit appear not to favor exculpation or indemnification provisions
21 that limit liability for negligence or breaches of fiduciary duties.
22 Compare, e.g., In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d at 245-47 (The Third
23 Circuit upheld a limitation of liability clause similar to the WCI
24 Group Exculpation Clause, limiting liability of the debtors, the
25 reorganized debtors, the creditors' committee and their respective
26

1 officers, directors, employees, and agents, among others, to
2 liability arising with respect to the subject chapter 11 cases as a
3 result of willful misconduct or gross negligence.); and In re
4 Halpern, 248 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (The court approved an
5 investment advisor contract that provided for indemnification of the
6 investment advisor for its own acts of negligence.) with In re
7 Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1357 (9th Cir. 1983)
8 ("Although a trustee is not liable in any manner for mistakes in
9 judgment where discretion is allowed,...he is subject to personal
10 liability for not only intentional but also negligent violations of
11 duties imposed upon him by law...."); In re Metricom, Inc., 275 B.R.
12 364 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (Broad indemnification and exculpation
13 provision of financial advisor agreement not approved, based on no
14 showing of reasonableness, but such provisions not invalid per se.);
15 In re Mortgage & Realty Trust, 123 B.R. 626 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991)
16 (Provisions of investment advisor agreement not approved providing
17 for indemnification extending only to acts other than negligence,
18 gross negligence or willful misconduct.); and In re Allegheny
19 Intern., Inc., 100 B.R. 244, 246-47 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (The court
20 required financial advisor indemnification provisions to exclude
21 negligence in addition to gross negligence and willful misconduct.
22 "...[I]ndemnification for negligence may be acceptable in 'the
23 workaday world for those acting at arm's length.' However, holding a
24 fiduciary harmless for its own negligence is shockingly inconsistent
25 with the strict standard of conduct for fiduciaries.").

1 Indemnification and exculpation clauses can be included in
2 chapter 11 plans as the products of negotiation among interested
3 parties. However, in these cases, Notesan and the United States
4 Trustee clearly have not consented to approval of the WCI Group
5 Exculpation Clause in the WCI Plan.

6 Prospective unavailability of insurance coverage may provide a
7 basis for determining exculpation or indemnification provisions to be
8 reasonable in a particular case. However, in these cases, as in In
9 re Metricom, Inc., 275 B.R. at 371-72, no evidence was presented that
10 insurance "is either unavailable or prohibitively expensive."

11 On the other hand, as I found with respect to the Creditors
12 Committee Exculpation Clause, I find that the WCI Group and their
13 officers and agents have a legitimate concern in these bitterly
14 contested cases with the potential for claims being asserted against
15 them regarding their postpetition acts.

16 Accordingly, I am prepared to approve the WCI Group Exculpation
17 Clause as complying with applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
18 for purposes of § 1129(a)(1)¹⁵, but only if the exculpation exceptions
19 are extended to cover negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty as
20 well as gross negligence and willful misconduct, both in the WCI
21 Group Exculpation Clause itself and in the analogous provisions of
22

23 ¹⁵ I agree with Judge Brown's conclusions in In re Great Western
24 Chemical Co., Case No. 301-36610-tmb11 (Oral Ruling on May 3, 2002),
25 that §§ 1129(a)(4) and (5) are not the appropriate standards for
26 consideration of exculpation and indemnification provisions as
provided for in the WCI Group Exculpation Clause.

1 the WCI Group Liquidating Trust Agreement, as cited by the United
2 States Trustee. I further find that the WCI Group Exculpation Clause
3 is a severable provision from the WCI Plan.

4 2. Injunction Provision

5 The WCI Group Injunction presents less thorny issues. Both
6 Notesan and the United States Trustee object to this provision.
7 Notesan's objection focuses on the breadth of the WCI Group
8 Injunction, arguing that it may prevent Notesan from pursuing its
9 direct claims against AMP. However, I interpret the WCI Group
10 Injunction as doing nothing more than enjoining parties from pursuing
11 claims or interests of the WCI Group that are discharged upon
12 confirmation of the WCI Plan, consistent with the discharge
13 provisions of the WCI Plan contained in Section 15.1, to which no
14 party has objected.

15 Section 15.1 of the WCI Plan is consistent with the effects of
16 discharge provisions of § 1141(c). Accordingly, the court has
17 authority under § 105(a) to approve the WCI Group Injunction to the
18 extent necessary and appropriate to enforce the provisions of
19 § 1141(c) and the consistent provisions of Section 15.1 of the WCI
20 Plan. I find that the WCI Group Injunction is not inconsistent with
21 the provisions of § 524(e) and that the United States Trustee's
22 concerns expressed in that regard are groundless. Accordingly, I
23 find that the WCI Group Injunction is consistent with the provisions
24 of the Bankruptcy Code.

25 F. Alaska Railroad Corporation

26

1 WorldNet and Alaska Fiber Star are parties to a number of
2 permits/leases (the "Permits") with the Alaska Railroad Corporation.
3 Since the Permits, among other things, encompass the rights of way in
4 which the WCI Group's fiber optic cable is laid between Anchorage and
5 Eielson Air Force Base and between Anchorage and Whittier in Alaska,
6 the WCI Group wishes to assume the Permits under the WCI Plan.

7 The WCI Group and the Alaska Railroad Corporation are in
8 litigation (the "Adversary Proceeding") pending before the United
9 States District Court for the District of Oregon, in which the WCI
10 Group is seeking in effect to obtain rate relief under the Permits.
11 Since jurisdiction over the Adversary Proceeding and the issues
12 relating to the WCI Group's claims in the Adversary Proceeding have
13 been divested from this court, I am in no position to make any
14 determinations with respect to WCI's claims in the Adversary
15 Proceeding. What the WCI Group would like me to do in confirming the
16 WCI Plan is to allow the WCI Group to assume the Permits while
17 holding in abeyance the WCI Group's obligation to make any cure
18 payments to the Alaska Railroad Corporation under the Permits until
19 the Adversary Proceeding is decided.

20 The Alaska Railroad Corporation is a sovereign entity of the
21 state of Alaska. However, the Alaska Railroad Corporation has
22 clearly and unequivocally waived any defense based on sovereign
23 immunity to allow me to hear and decide its objection to the WCI
24 Plan.

25 The WCI Group and the Alaska Railroad Corporation are agreed
26

1 as to the amounts that would be required to cure the WCI Group's
2 payment defaults under the Permits, under their current provisions.
3 See Alaska Railroad Corporation Ex. 1. However, the Alaska Railroad
4 Corporation objects to the WCI Group's proposal to hold cure payments
5 in abeyance until the Adversary Proceeding is decided, as contrary to
6 the requirements of § 365(b).

7 Section 365(b)(1)(A) provides that "[i]f there has been a
8 default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor,
9 the [debtor-in-possession] may not assume such contract or lease
10 unless, at the time of assumption of such contract or lease, the
11 [debtor-in-possession] cures, or provides adequate assurance that the
12 [debtor-in-possession] will promptly cure, such default...."

13 Under the WCI Plan, Neptune has agreed to assume the
14 obligation to pay any amounts owing to the Alaska Railroad
15 Corporation under the Permits. The WCI Trust, which will make
16 distributions to the WCI Group's creditors with respect to their
17 allowed claims, will have no obligation to make any required cure
18 payments to the Alaska Railroad Corporation.

19 The WCI Group wants the benefits of assumption of the Permits
20 without having to make any cure payments currently. Such an
21 assumption of benefits without burdens is not appropriate under
22 § 365(b)(1)(A). See, e.g., City of Covington v. Covington Landing
23 Ltd. Partnership, 71 F.3d 1221, 1226 (6th Cir. 1995) ("When the debtor
24 assumes the lease or the contract under § 365, it must assume both
25 the benefits and burdens of the contract. Neither the debtor nor the
26

1 bankruptcy court may excise material obligations owing to the non-
2 debtor contracting party."); and United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d
3 1428, 1432-33 (8th Cir. 1993) ("...[W]hen assuming a contract, the
4 debtor assumes all the benefits and burdens of the contract.").

5 Accordingly, I find that § 365(b)(1)(A) requires that the cure
6 payments, as currently required under the Permits and as set forth on
7 Alaska Railroad Corporation Ex. 1, must be paid consistent with the
8 provisions of Section 12.2 of the WCI Plan for cure of executory
9 contracts and unexpired leases generally, without waiting for a
10 determination of the Adversary Proceeding. However, I further find
11 that payment of the required cure amounts may be made with
12 reservation of any reimbursement, refund and/or setoff rights that
13 may be found to be appropriate in the Adversary Proceeding or in any
14 other appropriate proceeding initiated by the parties.

15 G. Conclusion

16 In light of the foregoing specific findings, I find that,
17 contingent on the WCI Group amending the WCI Plan: (1) to add
18 negligence and breach of fiduciary duties to the exceptions from
19 exculpation in the WCI Group Exculpation Clause and in the analogous
20 provisions for exculpation and/or indemnification in the WCI
21 Liquidating Trust Agreement; and (2) to provide for prompt cure of
22 the amounts currently in default under the Permits to the Alaska
23 Railroad Corporation, without waiting for a decision in the Adver-
24 sary Proceeding, the WCI Plan complies with all applicable provi-
25 sions under the Bankruptcy Code, as required under § 1129(a)(1).
26

1 Based upon these findings, I will deny Notesan's "Motion For Partial
2 Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule 52(c)" ("Motion for Partial
3 Judgement"), filed at the commencement of the Confirmation Hearing.
4 I note that in substance, the Motion for Partial Judgment was a
5 further (and untimely) objection to confirmation.

6 Good Faith

7 Under § 1129(a)(3), in order to confirm the WCI Plan, I must
8 find that the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any
9 means forbidden by law. Two concepts of "good faith" are in
10 circulation in these cases, and it is important to distinguish them
11 in coming to a decision on whether the WCI Plan was proposed in good
12 faith.

13 A. Good Faith in Filing

14 A subtext of Notesan's opposition to the conduct of
15 proceedings in these cases by the WCI Group and their representatives
16 is its position that AMP in effect engineered the WCI Group's
17 bankruptcy filings to protect AMP's interests in the WCI Group at the
18 expense of Notesan and, ultimately, to eliminate Notesan's equity
19 interest in the WCI Group. The WCI Group and AMP strongly disagree
20 with Notesan's position.

21 Such argument is more appropriate to a motion to dismiss a
22 chapter 11 case pursuant to § 1112(b) for cause. It is not
23 dispositive under § 1129(a)(3), because good faith determinations in
24 the context of confirmation are made based on consideration of the
25 totality of the circumstances, with a distinct focus on the
26

1 provisions of the plan. "Thus, for purposes of determining good
2 faith under section 1129(a)(3)...the important point of inquiry is
3 the plan itself and whether such plan will fairly achieve a result
4 consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code."
5 In Re Madison Hotel Assoc., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984).

6 At the Confirmation Hearing, no evidence was presented to
7 establish that AMP inappropriately influenced the decision to cause
8 the members of the WCI Group to file for protection under chapter 11
9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Mr. Maib testified that prior to his
10 employment by the WCI Group, he had no prior connection with AMP, and
11 he did not know Mr. Chehi, AMP's principal counsel in these cases.
12 Mr. Maib further testified that his recommendation to the WCI Board
13 for the WCI Group to file petitions in bankruptcy was based on his
14 own investigation of the situation confronting the WCI Group in
15 August 2001, and the Board decision to accept his recommendation was
16 unanimous. I find that Mr. Maib's testimony on this matter was
17 credible. Also, as noted at p. 26 supra, the Examiner stated in his
18 report, following the conclusion of his investigation, that he did
19 not believe that AMP caused the WCI Group to file their chapter 11
20 petitions or that AMP had anything to do with the hiring of Mr. Maib.

21 If AMP expected that chapter 11 would do wonders for its
22 investment in the WCI Group, I note that the WCI Plan currently
23 provides the following treatment for AMP: AMP will retain no
24 ownership interest in the WCI Group and is recognized as having no
25 secured claims against assets of the WCI Group. General nonpriority
26

1 unsecured creditors, with the exception of Alcatel, will be paid the
2 WCI Group's estimate of 100% of their allowed claims before AMP
3 receives a dime under the WCI Plan, and Notesan retains its direct
4 claims for litigation against AMP. AMP's projected distribution
5 under the WCI Plan, as amended, amounts to approximately 16% of the
6 principal amount of its advances to the WCI Group. See WCI Ex. 20.

7 B. Good Faith for Plan Confirmation Purposes

8 The principal challenge to the WCI Group's good faith in
9 proposing the WCI Plan focused on a revelation on the second day of
10 the Confirmation Hearing. Approximately two weeks before the
11 Confirmation Hearing, at his deposition taken by counsel for Notesan,
12 Mr. Maib revealed that a business relationship existed between
13 Neptune and Alaska Communications Systems ("ACS"), a substantial
14 competitor of GCI in the Alaska marketplace. At his deposition, Mr.
15 Maib further stated that the existence of that relationship might be
16 covered by a confidentiality agreement. Keith Maib Deposition, May
17 29, 2002, Vol. 2, pp. 147 and 157.

18 Only on the second day of the Confirmation Hearing did the
19 court and counsel for Notesan get an opportunity to review the
20 confidential business agreements between Neptune and ACS. Their
21 Memorandum of Understanding, Notesan Ex. 81 (the "Memorandum of
22 Understanding"), provides that ACS would provide a \$15 million dollar
23 loan to Neptune, substantially contemporaneously with confirmation of
24 the WCI Plan. As consideration, ACS would receive a three-year
25 option to purchase substantially all of the Alaska land based
26

1 facilities of the WCI Group (the "Alaska Assets"). The option could
2 be exercised by ACS cancelling the unpaid balance of the \$15 million
3 loan, plus accrued interest, with closing of the option purchase to
4 occur upon ACS receiving appropriate regulatory approval for its
5 acquisition of the Alaska Assets. In addition, under the Memorandum
6 of Understanding, Neptune agreed that ACS' consent would be required
7 with respect to pricing of certain long-term capacity transactions,
8 and all revenues from such transactions would be reserved for the
9 benefit of ACS during the option period or used to pay down the
10 Neptune debt to ACS.

11 Following the revelation of the terms of the Neptune/ACS
12 business deal, in testimony closed to all parties other than the WCI
13 Group, Notesan, Neptune, ACS and counsel for the Creditors Committee,
14 the court ended testimony for the day. After meeting with counsel
15 for the WCI Group, Notesan and the Creditors Committee in chambers,
16 the court suggested in open court that now would be a good time for
17 the various interested parties to take stock of their respective
18 positions and see if resolutions of their outstanding issues could be
19 negotiated.

20 When the Confirmation Hearing resumed the following day, the
21 WCI Group's counsel reported that no progress had been made in
22 negotiating settlements among the contending parties. The court then
23 stated that it was prepared to make a preliminary finding that there
24 was a material nondisclosure in the WCI Group disclosure materials.
25 At that point, AMP's counsel, who had not been present when the terms
26

1 of the Neptune/ACS business relationship were discussed in the closed
2 hearings the day before, rose to insist that no final decision should
3 be made in advance of a full airing of the issues. In addition, he
4 offered on behalf of AMP to contribute up to \$3 million from its
5 distributions under the WCI Plan to allow the general nonpriority
6 unsecured creditors, other than Alcatel which would agree to stand
7 pat with its 82.5% settlement distribution, to receive a distribution
8 of 100% of their allowed claims (the "AMP Proposal"). With that
9 offer, AMP's position was that unless further evidence established
10 collusive bidding or unlawful conduct in these cases, any
11 nondisclosure of information could not appropriately be characterized
12 as material. The United States Trustee echoed AMP's conclusion that
13 further testimony should be taken to obtain a full airing of relevant
14 evidence.

15 Thereafter, Mr. Maib testified at length about his strategy
16 and procedures for marketing the WCI Group. Working with
17 PricewaterhouseCoopers, he identified a list of potential buyers and
18 sent out "teaser letters" to about 50. Approximately 20 signed
19 nondisclosure agreements. However, only about a half dozen performed
20 due diligence. ACS was among them, but Mr. Maib testified that ACS
21 ultimately chose not to bid, because it had limited available capital
22 and primarily was interested in acquiring capacity in the Alaska
23 terrestrial network of the WCI Group only. However, ACS asked for
24 permission to talk with other potential bidders, and Mr. Maib
25 testified that he gave his permission for ACS to talk with Neptune
26

1 and with Landing Party, Inc. He also testified that he gave Neptune
2 permission to talk with ACS.

3 Mr. Maib further testified that ultimately he learned of a
4 business arrangement between Neptune and ACS, but he was not given
5 the details of the arrangement. He testified that Neptune told him
6 that the business deal with ACS was confidential and had no impact on
7 Neptune's proposed bid for the WCI Group. He also testified that he
8 discussed the existence of a Neptune/ACS business relationship with
9 representatives of the United States Department of Justice, who
10 advised that they had no concerns about the Neptune/ACS business
11 relationship, with respect to which they had received documents.

12 Mr. Maib further testified that he was seeking a transaction
13 that would provide the highest and best value with reliability of
14 closing. He considered the Neptune proposal as providing significant
15 and very positive value and a very high degree of certainty. He
16 testified that he did not disclose the Neptune/ACS business
17 relationship in the WCI Group disclosure statement for three reasons:
18 (1) he was not aware of the details of the relationship; (2) he
19 understood that the Neptune/ACS business relationship was subject to
20 confidentiality agreements; and (3) in light of the fact that most of
21 the creditors would not have a continuing relationship with the
22 reorganized debtors, he believed the Neptune/ACS relationship would
23 have "very little impact on meaningful disclosure to creditors."
24 Tr., Vol. 6, p. 859.

25 Mr. Maib further testified on cross-examination that in
26

1 putting bidders together, he was attempting to play likely potential
2 bidders-GCI, Neptune and ACS-off against one another in trying to
3 manage the bidding process.

4 "Good faith in proposing a plan of reorganization is assessed
5 by the bankruptcy judge and viewed under the totality of the
6 circumstances. In re Jorgensen, 66 B.R. 104, 108-109 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
7 1986). Good faith requires that a plan will achieve a result
8 consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Code. In re
9 Jorgensen, 66 B.R. at 109. It also requires a fundamental fairness
10 in dealing with one's creditors. Id." In re Stolrow's, Inc., 84
11 B.R. 167, 172 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988). See also, e.g., In re Corey,
12 892 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The...plan appears to be a fair
13 and well-reasoned effort to end the years of litigation surrounding
14 the Corey and Ellis bankruptcies; it results in payment in full of
15 all creditors, with a substantial portion of the estate remaining in
16 the debtor, an uncommon result in bankruptcy proceedings."); In re
17 Boulders on the River, Inc., 164 B.R. 99, 103-04 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
18 1994); and In re General Teamsters Warehousemen and Helpers Union
19 Local 890, 225 B.R. 719, 728-29 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998).

20 In these cases, I find that Mr. Maib made an error in judgment
21 in not fully investigating the business arrangement between Neptune
22 and ACS and failing to disclose it in the WCI Group disclosure
23 statement. However, I further find that Mr. Maib was motivated
24 throughout by his objective to obtain the highest and best possible
25 deal with a high likelihood of closing for the benefit of the WCI
26

1 Group creditors. I found his testimony with respect to his actions
2 in marketing the WCI Group and dealing with Neptune and ACS to be
3 credible. He took the steps he determined to be appropriate to
4 preserve value for the WCI Group creditors. I find that he acted in
5 good faith and consistent with his fiduciary duties in the interests
6 of the WCI Group creditors.

7 I also find that with the AMP Proposal, the nondisclosure was
8 not material. The resulting WCI Plan, as amended to encompass the
9 AMP Proposal, pays the general nonpriority unsecured creditors of the
10 WCI Group a projected 100% of their allowed claims. All parties who
11 addressed disclosure issues at final argument, including the chair of
12 the Creditors Committee, other than Notesan, urged confirmation of
13 the WCI Plan, and characterized the nondisclosure of the Neptune/ACS
14 business arrangement as not material to their votes with respect to
15 the WCI Plan. The WCI Plan further encompasses agreed settlements
16 with all other creditor constituencies, while preserving Notesan's
17 rights to pursue its direct claims against AMP. I find that the WCI
18 Plan, as amended, viewed in the totality of the circumstances of
19 these cases, provides results that are consistent with the purposes
20 of the Bankruptcy Code and is fundamentally fair in its treatment of
21 the WCI Group's creditors. I find that the WCI Plan has been
22 proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.¹⁶

23
24 ¹⁶ Since the AMP Proposal does nothing but enhance the treatment
25 afforded to general nonpriority unsecured creditors under the WCI
26 Plan, I find it appropriate to treat all such creditors who

(continued...)

1 Results under the WCI Plan v. Chapter 7 Liquidation

2 Under § 1129(a)(7), in order to confirm the WCI Plan, I must
3 find either that each impaired class of claims or interests has
4 accepted the plan or will receive under the plan at least as much as
5 the subject class of claims or interests would receive in a
6 hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation.

7 WCI Plan class acceptances are discussed under "Ballot
8 Summaries" at pp. 13-15 supra.

9 The WCI Group's liquidation analyses are set forth in WCI Exs.
10 19 and 21. Mr. Maib discussed both exhibits during the course of his
11 testimony. He personally participated in the preparation of both
12 exhibits.

13 Ex. 21 sets forth a continuum of potential results for
14 unsecured creditors in chapter 7, moving from best case scenarios to
15 worse case scenarios, assuming equitable subordination of AMP's
16 claims and assuming no equitable subordination of AMP's claims in the
17 best and worse cases. In the best case scenario, assuming equitable
18 subordination of AMP's claims, general nonpriority unsecured
19 creditors could receive up to 100% of their allowed claims. However,
20 Mr. Maib considered such a scenario very unlikely, particularly in
21 light of the potential for AT&T to claim that the approved AT&T
22 settlement could not be implemented because a chapter 7 trustee could
23

24 ¹⁶(...continued)
25 originally voted in favor of the WCI Plan to have voted in favor of
26 the WCI Plan as amended to incorporate the AMP Proposal, pursuant to
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3019.

1 not provide adequate assurances of performance by the WCI Group of
2 their long term obligations under the AT&T settlement. He testified
3 that the worse case scenarios, projecting dividends to unsecured
4 creditors of 59% of their claims if AMP's claims were subordinated
5 and 7% of their claims if AMP's claims were not subordinated, were
6 more likely scenarios, and I found his testimony and reasoning to be
7 persuasive.

8 Interest holders would receive nothing for their interests in
9 a chapter 7 liquidation under any scenario. See WCI Exs. 19 and 21.
10 I find that conclusion supported by the evidence in the record.

11 Under the WCI Plan, as amended to encompass the AMP Proposal,
12 general nonpriority unsecured creditors in each of the WCI Group
13 chapter 11 cases are projected to receive a dividend of 100% of their
14 allowed claims. In these circumstances, I find that nonaccepting
15 impaired classes of claims and interests would receive amounts under
16 the WCI Plan that are not less than they would receive in chapter 7,
17 and the requirements of § 1129(a)(7) are satisfied.

18 Feasibility

19 Under § 1129(a)(11), in order to confirm the WCI Plan, I must
20 find that it is feasible, with confirmation not likely to be followed
21 by the liquidation or need for further financial reorganization of
22 the reorganized WCI Group entities.

23 I am not required to determine that future commercial success
24 for a reorganized debtor is inevitable in order to find that a
25 reorganization plan in chapter 11 is feasible.

1 "Guaranteed success in the stiff winds of commerce
2 without the protection of the Code is not the standard
3 under § 1129(a)(11). Most debtors emerge from
4 reorganization with a significant handicap. But a plan
5 based on impractical or visionary expectations cannot
6 be confirmed....All that is required is that there be
7 reasonable assurance of commercial viability." In re
8 The Prudential Energy Co., 58 B.R. 857, 862 (Bankr.
9 S.D.N.Y. 1986).

10 See also In re Acequia, Inc., 787 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986); In
11 re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374, 1382 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The
12 purpose of section 1129(a)(11) is to prevent confirmation of
13 visionary schemes which promise creditors and equity security holders
14 more under a proposed plan than the debtor can possibly attain after
15 confirmation."); and In re Sagewood Manor Assoc. Ltd. Partnership,
16 223 B.R. 756, 762-63 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1998) ("While a reviewing court
17 'must examine 'the totality of the circumstances' in order to
18 determine whether the plan fulfills the requirements of
19 § 1129(a)(11),'...only 'a relatively low threshold of proof [is]
20 necessary to satisfy the feasibility requirement.'...The key element
21 of feasibility is whether there exists a reasonable probability that
22 the provisions of the plan of reorganization can be performed.").

23 Factors that the court should consider in evaluating evidence
24 as to feasibility include "(1) the adequacy of the financial
25 structure; (2) the earning power of the business; (3) economic
26 conditions; and (4) the ability of management." In re Agawam
27 Creative Marketing Assoc. Inc., 63 B.R. 612, 619-20 (Bankr. D. Mass.
28 1986) quoting from In re Merrimack Valley Oil Co., Inc., 32 B.R. 485,
29 488 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).

1 Under the WCI Plan, in light of the proposed \$1.4 million
2 settlement with DeJon Corporation, the purchase price to Neptune is
3 \$43.75 million, plus \$700,000 (one half the cost of the proposed
4 DeJon Corporation settlement), or a total of \$44.45 million. Neptune
5 has funded a \$5,000,000 escrow deposit. The President and Chief
6 Executive Officer of Neptune Communications, LLC, Donald J. Schroeder
7 ("Mr. Schroeder"), testified that at the time Neptune submitted its
8 bid during the WCI Group auction process, Neptune provided an equity
9 financing commitment letter in the amount of \$33 million. He further
10 testified that upon confirmation of the WCI Plan, Neptune would be
11 capitalized at approximately \$50 million with approximately \$35
12 million in contributions committed from the Carlisle Group and \$15
13 million from the ACS loan. He also testified that he was
14 contributing \$1 million of his own money to the transaction.

15 Brook Coburn, a Managing Director of the Carlisle Group,
16 testified that the Carlisle Group had a legally binding commitment to
17 contribute \$35 million to fund Neptune's capital requirements to
18 purchase the WCI Group assets. He further testified that the
19 Carlisle Group had targeted an additional \$20 million for Neptune's
20 financing should the need arise.

21 Wayne Graham, a principal of ACS, testified that ACS was
22 committed to loaning \$15 million to Neptune. At final argument,
23 counsel for ACS confirmed that ACS' commitment to lend the \$15
24 million was not conditioned on receipt of any regulatory approvals.

25 Mr. Schroeder testified as to his substantial experience and
26

1 the substantial experience of the other members of the Neptune
2 management team, both in the telecommunications industry generally
3 and particularly regarding the telecommunications business in Alaska.

4 Mr. Schroeder also testified as to the assumptions behind the
5 cash based projections for the reorganized WCI Group, admitted as WCI
6 Ex. 27. He estimated in projecting income that the reorganized WCI
7 Group ought to be able to capture 75% of incremental demand in the
8 relevant market. Mr. Schroeder expressed his confidence that the
9 reorganized WCI Group, operating under the Neptune management team,
10 could meet the WCI Ex. 27 projections and would experience no further
11 need for financial reorganization.

12 Finally, Mr. Schroeder testified that Neptune had obtained all
13 required federal and state regulatory approvals to acquire and
14 operate the reorganized WCI Group. Accordingly, Neptune had waived
15 any regulatory approval contingency to closing the purchase of WCI
16 Group assets upon confirmation of the WCI Plan.

17 Notesan raised two primary objections to feasibility of the
18 WCI Plan: (a) in cross-examination of Mr. Schroeder, Notesan
19 questioned the soundness of the WCI Ex. 27 projections; and (b)
20 Notesan questioned whether regulatory approvals might be revisited
21 and revoked in light of a failure to disclose the business
22 relationship between Neptune and ACS.

23 Notesan's challenge to the reorganized WCI Group pro forma
24 financials focused primarily on three points. First, Neptune's
25 financial projections do not tie into the WCI Group financial
26

1 statements. Mr. Schroeder testified that the WCI Group's historical
2 financial performance had been taken into account in preparing the
3 projections. That said, it is not particularly surprising that
4 projections prepared on a cash basis as at July 1, 2002, would not
5 tie into the last WCI Group financial statements, prepared
6 consistently with generally accepted accounting principles as at
7 December 31, 2001. Second, if ACS exercises its option to acquire
8 the Alaska Assets, the income included on the projections from those
9 assets would disappear, and that potential loss of income is not
10 accounted for in the projections. Finally, the accounting for long-
11 term capacity sales income and liabilities is not clear.

12 The projection of future business income and expense is not an
13 exact science. Accordingly, at best, projections provide no better
14 than an estimate of future financial performance of an enterprise.
15 The failure to account for the potential loss of income from exercise
16 of the ACS option is a defect in the reorganized WCI Group pro forma
17 financial statements. In addition, to hear from Mr. Schroeder that
18 the accounting treatment of long term capacity sales earnings and
19 expense in the telecommunications industry is an "evolving concept"
20 does not exactly inspire confidence in the era of Enron-style off
21 balance sheet accounting.

22 Nevertheless, Mr. Schroeder's base income assumption that the
23 reorganized WCI Group can capture 75% of incremental demand in the
24 relevant marketplace appears plausible. Mr. Schroeder testified as
25 to his understanding that the GCI cable system cost about \$125
26

1 million to complete. Under the WCI Plan, Neptune would acquire the
2 WCI Group fiber optic cable network for less than 50% of GCI's
3 investment. That significant cost advantage reasonably ought to
4 provide Neptune with substantial competitive business opportunities,
5 translatable into the capture of a majority of incremental demand, as
6 projected by Neptune.

7 Since Neptune has waived the regulatory contingency to closing
8 of its purchase of WCI Group assets, Notesan's regulatory approval
9 objection is essentially a rear-guard action: Neptune might be able
10 to close following confirmation of the WCI Plan, but its regulatory
11 approvals might be revoked by the FCC and/or the Regulatory
12 Commission of Alaska ("RCA") based upon the failure of Neptune to
13 disclose its business relationship with ACS, resulting in curtailment
14 of the business operations of the reorganized WCI Group to their
15 substantial financial detriment.

16 Jeffrey Mayhook, Notesan's regulatory expert, testified that
17 in his opinion Neptune's failure to disclose the existence of the ACS
18 Memorandum of Understanding in Neptune's regulatory applications
19 before the FCC and the RCA was a material omission that could result
20 in the imposition of sanctions in both forums.

21 Mr. Maib previously had testified that he had been informed by
22 the Department of Justice that the work of its telecommunications
23 task force was coordinated with the FCC and that the Department of
24 Justice was aware of the business relationship between Neptune and
25 ACS. On that basis, and further based on the advice of his counsel
26

1 who previously had practiced before the FCC, Mr. Maib determined that
2 no follow-up with the FCC regarding regulatory concerns was required.

3 Mr. Mayhook testified that the concerns of the Department of
4 Justice, focusing on mergers and acquisitions, would not necessarily
5 be the same concerns as those of the FCC. He further testified that
6 the rights of ACS under the Memorandum of Understanding with respect
7 to pricing, particularly in light of ACS' very strong position as a
8 competitor in the Alaska marketplace, likely would trigger heightened
9 scrutiny by the RCA of final approval of the Neptune application(s)
10 for authority. However, although he testified that the appointment
11 of a receiver, among other things, was a possible sanction that could
12 be imposed by the RCA, Mr. Mayhook thought that an order shutting
13 down operations of the reorganized WCI Group fiber optic cable
14 network would be unlikely.

15 In light of the foregoing record from the evidence presented,
16 I find that Neptune will be funded with adequate capital to fund the
17 distributions required under the WCI Plan, and that Neptune and the
18 reorganized WCI Group will have access to adequate capital resources
19 to fund their operations going forward. I find that in spite of the
20 deficiencies of the WCI Ex. 27 pro forma financial statements for the
21 reorganized WCI Group, the reorganized WCI Group entities have
22 substantial income potential arising from their relatively low cost
23 acquisition of the WCI Group fiber optic cable network, that should
24 give them a competitive advantage to capture a majority share of
25 incremental demand in the relevant marketplace. The reorganized WCI
26

1 Group may not realize the income projected in the pro forma financial
2 statements, but I find that they have a reasonable shot at attaining
3 commercial viability. I find that the reorganized WCI Group should
4 benefit from the operational experience of the Neptune management
5 group, both in the telecommunications industry generally and in the
6 Alaska marketplace in particular. I find that since Neptune has
7 waived regulatory approval as a contingency to closing the
8 transaction provided for in the WCI Plan, if I confirm the WCI Plan,
9 Neptune's purchase of the WCI Group assets is likely to close. Based
10 on the record presented in these cases, I have no basis to determine
11 what sanction(s), if any, the FCC or the RCA might impose as a result
12 of a failure by Neptune to disclose the existence or substance of its
13 business relationship with ACS in regulatory applications. However,
14 I find that it is not likely that the WCI Group fiber optic cable
15 network would be shut down. Accordingly, I find that confirmation of
16 the WCI Plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the
17 need for further financial reorganization of the reorganized WCI
18 Group.

19 In light of the foregoing findings, I find that the WCI Plan
20 is feasible for purposes of § 1129(a)(11).

21 Cramdown

22 Since the class of general nonpriority unsecured creditors in
23 the WorldNet case, Class 9.2, did not vote to accept the WCI Plan
24 (see Ballot Summary discussion at pp. 14-15 supra), the requirement
25 of § 1129(a)(8) that all classes of impaired claims accept the WCI
26

1 Plan has not been satisfied. Accordingly, if I am to confirm the WCI
2 Plan, I must find that the requirements of § 1129(b) are satisfied.

3 Section 1129(b) provides that if all requirements of § 1129(a)
4 are satisfied other than § 1129(a)(8), a chapter 11 plan still may be
5 confirmed over the rejection of an impaired class of unsecured claims
6 if the plan does not discriminate unfairly and is "fair and
7 equitable" in its treatment of such class.

8 In these cases, the WCI Plan, as amended to include the AMP
9 Proposal, provides that the Class 9.2 general unsecured creditors
10 will receive the same treatment as every other class of general
11 nonpriority unsecured claims: their allowed claims are projected to
12 be paid in full on the same basis and at the same times as are all
13 other allowed general nonpriority unsecured claims. Accordingly, I
14 find that the WCI Plan does not discriminate unfairly against the
15 Class 9.2 WorldNet general unsecured claims.

16 The "fair and equitable" standard requires either: (1) that
17 the holders of Class 9.2 claims receive or retain on account of their
18 claims property equal to the allowed amounts of their respective
19 claims as of the effective date of the WCI Plan; or (2) no claimant
20 of a class of claims or interests junior to the Class 9.2 claims will
21 receive or retain anything under the WCI Plan. Since the Class 9.2
22 claimants are projected to receive payment of 100% of their allowed
23 claims under the WCI Plan, as amended, I find that the first
24 alternative for satisfaction of the "fair and equitable" standard
25 likely is satisfied. However, in any event, no claimant or interest
26

1 holder with a priority junior to the Class 9.2 claimants is receiving
2 anything under the WCI Plan. Accordingly, I find that the second
3 alternative standard for "fair and equitable" treatment of Class 9.2
4 is satisfied under the WCI Plan as well.¹⁷

5 Ultimate Findings on Confirmation

6 Conditioned upon the WCI Group amending the WCI Plan as
7 required to meet the requirements of § 1129(a)(1), as set forth at
8 pp. 45-46 supra, I find that the WCI Plan satisfies all of the
9 requirements for confirmation set forth in § 1129(a), other than the
10 requirement of § 1129(a)(8) regarding acceptance by all impaired
11 classes of claims with respect to Class 9.2. I further find that the
12 requirements for cramdown under § 1129(b) with respect to Class 9.2
13 have been satisfied. Accordingly, I will confirm the WCI Plan.
14 Counsel for the WCI Group should prepare and submit an appropriate
15 form of Confirmation Order. The court will prepare an order denying
16 Notesan's Motion for Partial Judgment.

17 _____
18 ¹⁷ Notesan may argue that the recovery by general nonpriority
19 unsecured creditors of 100% of their allowed claims is only a
20 projected estimate under the WCI Plan, and AMP, with what Notesan
21 regards as a claim that should be treated solely as an equity
22 interest, may receive some payment before the Class 9.2 claimants
23 receive payment in full in violation of the "fair and equitable"
24 standard. However, based upon my approval of the AMP Settlement, as
25 discussed at pages 28-30 supra, to the extent that AMP receives
26 distributions under the WCI Plan, any such distributions will be made
with respect to AMP's allowed general nonpriority unsecured claim,
which though effectively subordinated, is of equal priority with the
claims of Class 9.2 creditors. The WCI Plan provides for no
distributions to interest holders.

RANDALL L. DUNN
Bankruptcy Judge

cc: Jonathan E. Cohen
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Johnston A. Mitchell
Teresa H. Pearson
Robert J Vanden Bos
Leon Simson
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